Common enemy vs. "Trustware": how do you build cohesion that doesn't need hatred?

The first thing to say honestly is this: this mechanism exists because it works. Two important writers on intergroup relations, from two different fields — religion and strategy — found that conflict between groups increases solidarity within the group. In René Girard's framework, the scapegoat mechanism deflects violence onto a victim or an out-group, thereby producing order and uniformity. Edward Luttwak writes explicitly about how a unifying threat can maintain internal cohesion and cooperation against a common enemy.

But precisely because it works, there is a need to understand its deep problems.

The first problem is that this is negative cohesion

A group that rallies around an enemy knows very well what it is against, but far less clearly what it is for. This is cohesion that excels at mobilization, not at building; at rallying, not at creating. It is therefore strong during threat, but often very weak when the task is managing shared life, institutions, routine, repair, and internal diversity. This also follows from the very idea of a "unifying threat": if the threat is the glue, the glue weakens when there is no threat.

The second problem is diagnostic distortion

In Girard's account, the scapegoat does not resolve the source of tension; it merely concentrates it onto a single victim and grants the group momentary relief and uniformity. In other words, the mechanism provides the feeling of a solution without solving the structural problem that generated the violence or rivalry in the first place. This is one of the greatest dangers: the group feels it has "understood the problem," but has in fact only found an address to offload onto.

The third problem is addiction to threat

If an external threat produces internal cohesion, leaders, organizations, and sometimes groups themselves develop an incentive to maintain threat, to amplify it, or to frame every difficulty in terms of an enemy. This does not mean every threat is fabricated; it means the system learns to feed on it. Luttwak is very useful here: he shows that adversarial logic can be highly effective at the strategic level. The problem begins when that logic seeps inward and shifts from a state of emergency to a mode of governance, a mode of organization, or a mode of consciousness. That is no longer just "using the enemy" — it is dependency on the enemy.

The fourth problem is the suppression of internal criticism

Once a group coheres around an enemy, internal criticism begins to look like weakness, deviation, or even betrayal. Research on military organizations has articulated this well: in competitive, hierarchical systems, there is a risk that cohesion and homogeneity will override the ability to voice criticism. This is not a side issue; it is a structural problem. Once the enemy becomes an organizing principle, the group's internal truth is compromised.

The fifth problem is moral and cognitive corruption

Intergroup threat increases stereotyping and hostility toward the out-group, and research has also found that intergroup threat can amplify implicit stereotypes. In other words, the enemy mechanism does not only unite "us"; it also simplifies, rigidifies, and distorts our perception of "them." This is a heavy cost, because it damages the ability to see complexity, to distinguish between an actual enemy and a rival, a competitor, a critic, or simply someone who does not belong to our camp.

The sixth problem is that the external enemy tends to become an internal one

Once the group becomes accustomed to thinking along a threat line, all internal diversities become suspect. The mechanism recruited against an external enemy migrates inward: minorities, opposition, critics, or even people with a different style begin to be perceived as a security or moral problem. This is a logic that erodes thinking and solutions, because it needs rapid emotional uniformity more than it needs stable institutions and analysis.

Therefore, the problem with this mode of thinking is not only moral. It is also pragmatic.

• It builds a group that knows how to mobilize, but not necessarily how to live together.
• It generates the appearance of closeness, but not necessarily infrastructure.
• It generates uniformity, but not necessarily trust.

In AKBAN terms, it sometimes generates cohesion, but not necessarily Trustware.

Because Trustware is an infrastructure built on reciprocity, competence, framework, repair, and the ability to bear diversity without dismantling the group. The enemy mechanism does nearly the opposite: it shortcuts to unity through tension, fear, and redirected fire.

There is also a more constructive alternative. Hostility between groups is reduced not only by the presence of a common enemy, but also by shared higher goals that require real cooperation. In other words, people can be united not only against someone, but around a mission that cannot be achieved alone. Actually, many ordinary tasks of a community or an organizatio are already working like this, positively.

So if I distill this to one sentence: a common enemy is a fast way to produce an "us," but a poor way to build a society, an organization, or a community that can hold over time.